The Uncomfortable Truth: We Celebrate When the "Right" Criminals Get Hacked
When BreachForums,one of the internet's most notorious criminal marketplaces,had its own user database leaked this week, something revealing happened in cybersecurity circles. Instead of the usual hand-wringing about data breaches and victim impact, there was something else: quiet satisfaction. Maybe even a few barely-suppressed smiles.
This reaction exposes an uncomfortable truth about our industry. Despite our professional codes of ethics and public stance against unauthorized access, many security practitioners harbor a dirty little secret: sometimes we root for the hackers.
The BreachForums breach wasn't just another data incident. It was poetic justice served digitally, and our collective response reveals a moral complexity we rarely acknowledge publicly. This matters because the cybersecurity industry's credibility rests on consistent ethical principles, not situational ethics that change based on who's getting attacked.
When Honor Among Thieves Breaks Down
BreachForums represented everything wrong with the modern cybercrime ecosystem. The forum facilitated the sale of stolen personal data, corporate network access, and other illegal services. Its 324,000 users weren't casual privacy advocates,they were active participants in a criminal economy that has caused billions in damages and immeasurable personal harm.
So when someone,possibly connected to the ShinyHunters extortion group,leaked the forum's user database, complete with IP addresses and registration details, the incident took on the character of frontier justice. The criminals got a taste of their own medicine.
The leaked data includes over 70,000 records with real IP addresses that could be "valuable to law enforcement," according to security researchers. In other words, this breach might actually help catch the bad guys. It's vigilante justice wrapped in SQL dumps and compressed into a 7Zip file.
The forum's administrator, known as "N/A," acknowledged the breach with the kind of matter-of-fact tone usually reserved for legitimate businesses explaining server maintenance. "The data in question originates from an old users-table leak dating back to August 2025, during the period when BreachForums was being restored/recovered," they wrote, as if discussing a minor accounting error rather than a massive operational security failure.
The Security Industry's Dirty Secret
Here's what we don't talk about at security conferences: many practitioners privately celebrate when criminal infrastructure gets disrupted, regardless of whether law enforcement or other criminals are doing the disrupting. We've created an informal hierarchy of acceptable targets, and criminal forums sit squarely in the "deserves whatever happens to them" category.
This selective moral outrage isn't entirely unjustified. BreachForums wasn't hosting political dissidents or privacy advocates. It was a marketplace for human misery, where stolen medical records, Social Security numbers, and corporate credentials changed hands for cryptocurrency. The forum's previous iterations were linked to major data breaches affecting millions of innocent victims.
When security researchers analyze the BreachForums leak, they're not looking for ways to protect the exposed users,they're looking for intelligence opportunities. The leaked IP addresses become investigative leads. The usernames become attribution data points. The forum's operational security failures become case studies in how criminal organizations can be disrupted.
The uncomfortable question: if we're comfortable with this kind of digital vigilantism when it targets criminals, what does that say about our commitment to universal principles of data protection and privacy?
The Honeypot Problem
Adding another layer of complexity, BreachForums has been repeatedly accused of being a law enforcement honeypot. ShinyHunters claimed the forum was controlled by law enforcement, though administrators denied this. Whether true or not, the accusation highlights how blurred the lines have become between legitimate law enforcement operations and criminal activity online.
If BreachForums was indeed a honeypot, then this "breach" might actually represent law enforcement losing control of its own operation. Alternatively, it could be a sophisticated misdirection campaign designed to maintain the forum's credibility among criminals while gathering intelligence.
This ambiguity should make security professionals uncomfortable. We're essentially cheering for an attack on what might be a legitimate law enforcement operation, based solely on our assumption that the target deserved it.
The honeypot theory also raises questions about proportionality. Law enforcement honeypots are designed to gather evidence for prosecution, following legal frameworks and oversight mechanisms. Criminal-on-criminal attacks follow no such constraints. When we celebrate the latter, we're implicitly endorsing a more aggressive approach to cyber operations than our own governments are legally allowed to pursue.
The Attribution Game Changes Everything
What makes the BreachForums incident particularly interesting is the attribution complexity. ShinyHunters, the group allegedly behind the leak, claimed they weren't actually responsible for distributing it. A website "named after the ShinyHunters extortion gang" released the data, but the group itself denied involvement.
This kind of false flag operation,or plausible deniability,is becoming standard in the cybercrime ecosystem. Groups routinely disavow operations that might bring unwanted attention while benefiting from the chaos they create. It's a sophisticated form of information warfare that makes traditional attribution nearly impossible.
For security professionals trying to track these groups, this creates a fascinating problem. How do you analyze threats from organizations that exist in a constant state of schrodinger's responsibility? ShinyHunters simultaneously did and didn't leak the BreachForums database, depending on who's asking and when.
This attribution shell game should concern us more than it seems to. When we can't reliably identify who's attacking whom, our celebration of "justified" attacks becomes even more problematic. We might be cheering for actions taken by the very criminals we're supposed to be defending against.
The Moral Hazard of Selective Ethics
The security industry's inconsistent response to cybercrime reveals a deeper problem: we've developed situational ethics around data protection. Steal from a hospital? That's unconscionable. Steal from criminals? That's intelligence gathering.
This moral flexibility creates real problems for the industry's credibility. If we only defend data protection principles when the victims are sympathetic, we're not really defending principles at all,we're just picking sides.
Consider how we discuss different types of breaches. When criminals target legitimate businesses or individuals, we focus on victim impact, systemic vulnerabilities, and the need for better defenses. When criminals target other criminals, we focus on intelligence value and disruption of criminal operations.
Both responses might be practically justified, but they're ethically inconsistent. Either unauthorized access is wrong, or it isn't. Either data protection is a fundamental right, or it's a privilege we grant based on moral worthiness.
What We Should Actually Do
The security industry needs to acknowledge this moral complexity rather than pretending it doesn't exist. Our current approach,publicly condemning all unauthorized access while privately celebrating attacks on criminal infrastructure,undermines our credibility and creates confusion about our actual values.
Instead, we should develop more nuanced frameworks for discussing cybercrime that acknowledge the reality of criminal-on-criminal attacks without abandoning our ethical principles. This means being honest about when we think certain attacks serve broader security interests, while still maintaining that unauthorized access is generally wrong.
We should also be more transparent about our relationship with law enforcement operations. If we're going to analyze and benefit from data obtained through questionable means, we should acknowledge that explicitly rather than maintaining the fiction that all our intelligence comes from purely legitimate sources.
Most importantly, we need to recognize that celebrating vigilante justice,even against criminals,sets a dangerous precedent. Today we're cheering for attacks on BreachForums. Tomorrow we might find ourselves defending against groups who decided our organizations were legitimate targets based on their own moral calculations.
The Price of Inconsistency
The BreachForums leak reveals something troubling about the cybersecurity industry's moral foundation. We've become comfortable with ethical inconsistency as long as it serves our practical interests. This flexibility might seem pragmatic in the short term, but it undermines the principled stance we need to maintain credibility in policy debates and public discourse.
When we selectively apply our ethical framework based on target worthiness, we're essentially arguing that data protection is conditional rather than fundamental. That's a dangerous precedent in an era where governments and corporations are increasingly eager to justify surveillance and cyber operations based on the perceived righteousness of their cause.
The criminals who used BreachForums deserved to face consequences for their actions. But those consequences should come through legitimate law enforcement and judicial processes, not through digital vigilantism that we celebrate from the sidelines. Our industry's future credibility depends on maintaining that distinction, even when it's inconvenient.
,-
**