The Cybersecurity Industry's Deception Problem: When Defense Becomes Theater
The cybersecurity industry has a credibility problem, and it's getting worse. The recent dust-up between threat actors calling themselves "Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters" and cybersecurity firm Resecurity illustrates a troubling trend: security companies are increasingly choosing theater over substance, deception over transparency, and reputation management over genuine security improvement.
Here's what happened: Threat actors claimed they breached Resecurity's systems and stole employee data, internal communications, and client information. Resecurity countered that the attackers had only accessed a honeypot containing fake data designed to monitor their activities. The hackers said the attack was retaliation for Resecurity employees allegedly posing as buyers to gather intelligence on the group's operations.
Strip away the technical details and what emerges is a pattern that should concern anyone who cares about cybersecurity: an industry increasingly comfortable with deception as a primary tool, where "catching" attackers has become more important than actually securing systems.
The Theater of Cyber Deception
Resecurity's honeypot strategy represents something deeper than a single incident response. It's emblematic of how cybersecurity has evolved from a discipline focused on building robust defenses into one obsessed with elaborate performances designed to outwit adversaries and impress audiences.
The company deployed what they called "synthetic datasets designed to closely resemble real-world business data" including over 28,000 fake consumer records and 190,000 fake payment transactions. They monitored the threat actors for weeks, generating intelligence reports and presumably case studies that demonstrate their sophisticated detection capabilities.
But here's the uncomfortable question: What actual security value did this elaborate deception provide?
The answer reveals the core problem. The honeypot didn't prevent a real breach, improve Resecurity's actual security posture, or protect any customers. Instead, it created an artificial scenario designed to make the company look competent and the attackers look foolish. The primary beneficiary wasn't cybersecurity broadly, but Resecurity's reputation specifically.
This isn't unique to Resecurity. Across the industry, security companies are increasingly investing in deception technologies, threat hunting theater, and elaborate cat-and-mouse games with adversaries. The marketing materials practically write themselves: "We detected the threat actors early," "We monitored their every move," "We turned the tables on the attackers."
Meanwhile, the fundamentals that actually prevent breaches remain neglected.
When Intelligence Gathering Becomes Social Engineering
The threat actors' retaliation claim adds another troubling dimension to this story. They alleged that Resecurity employees posed as buyers during the sale of stolen data, seeking free samples and additional information about the group's operations.
If true, this crosses a line that the cybersecurity industry has been approaching for years. There's a meaningful difference between passive intelligence gathering and actively engaging with criminal groups through deception. When cybersecurity companies start posing as customers in criminal marketplaces, they're not just gathering intelligence, they're participating in criminal ecosystems.
The ethical implications are stark. By posing as buyers, security companies may be providing market validation for stolen data, encouraging further criminal activity, and potentially facilitating actual transactions that harm real victims. The intelligence value might be high, but the moral cost is higher.
This behavior reflects a broader shift in how the cybersecurity industry views its role. Rather than focusing primarily on defense and protection, many companies now see themselves as active participants in an ongoing conflict with threat actors. The problem is that this militaristic approach often undermines the very security outcomes it claims to support.
The Reputation Management Trap
The most revealing aspect of the Resecurity incident isn't the technical details of the honeypot or even the ethical questions around social engineering. It's how quickly the entire episode became about narrative control rather than security improvement.
Resecurity's response wasn't primarily focused on lessons learned, system improvements, or helping other organizations avoid similar probes. Instead, it was a sophisticated communications strategy designed to flip a potentially damaging breach claim into a demonstration of the company's advanced capabilities.
This pattern repeats across the industry. When faced with security incidents, companies increasingly default to elaborate explanations about how they were actually in control all along, how the incident was part of a larger intelligence gathering operation, or how they turned the tables on the attackers.
The message is always the same: We're not victims; we're the smart ones who saw it coming.
But this response pattern creates perverse incentives. If every incident becomes an opportunity to demonstrate sophistication and control, companies may unconsciously begin engineering situations that allow them to tell these stories. The line between legitimate security operations and reputation management theater becomes increasingly blurred.
The Counterargument: Intelligence Has Value
Critics of this analysis will argue that intelligence gathering and deception technologies provide genuine security value. They're not entirely wrong. Understanding threat actor techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) can inform better defenses. Honeypots can provide early warning of attacks and help organizations understand their threat landscape.
Moreover, active intelligence gathering, even when it involves some deception, can disrupt criminal operations and protect potential victims. If Resecurity's activities led to the identification of threat actors or the disruption of criminal marketplaces, the broader security community benefits.
The sophisticated monitoring of the threat actors' activities for weeks potentially provided valuable insights into their methodologies and infrastructure. This intelligence could help other organizations recognize and defend against similar attacks.
There's also an argument that in an asymmetric conflict with well-resourced criminal groups, security professionals need to use every tool at their disposal, including deception and active intelligence gathering.
Why the Counterargument Fails
While these points have merit, they miss the fundamental issue: opportunity cost and misaligned incentives.
Every hour spent monitoring threat actors in an artificial honeypot environment is an hour not spent improving actual security controls. Every dollar invested in elaborate deception technologies is a dollar not invested in basic security hygiene that prevents the vast majority of breaches.
The uncomfortable truth is that most cybersecurity incidents aren't sophisticated nation-state attacks that require advanced deception technologies to detect and counter. They're basic attacks exploiting well-known vulnerabilities, social engineering, or configuration errors that could be prevented with straightforward security measures.
When cybersecurity companies invest heavily in dramatic threat hunting and intelligence gathering operations, they're often optimizing for the marketing story rather than the security outcome. The result is an industry increasingly skilled at catching sophisticated threats while remaining surprisingly vulnerable to simple ones.
More problematically, the emphasis on deception and active intelligence gathering creates a feedback loop where cybersecurity becomes increasingly adversarial and less collaborative. When security companies start engaging with threat actors through social engineering and elaborate deception campaigns, they signal that cybersecurity is fundamentally about outwitting adversaries rather than building robust defenses.
What Should Change
The path forward requires a fundamental reorientation of industry priorities. Instead of investing heavily in elaborate deception campaigns and threat hunting theater, cybersecurity companies should focus on the basics that actually prevent breaches: secure system architectures, proper access controls, comprehensive monitoring of actual production systems, and clear incident response procedures.
When security incidents occur, the default response should be transparency and learning rather than narrative control. Companies should openly discuss what went wrong, what they learned, and how they're improving their defenses. The goal should be strengthening the entire ecosystem rather than protecting individual reputations.
For intelligence gathering, the industry needs clear ethical guidelines that distinguish between passive monitoring and active participation in criminal ecosystems. Posing as buyers in criminal marketplaces crosses a line that undermines the moral authority cybersecurity companies need to advocate for better security practices.
Most importantly, cybersecurity companies need to resist the temptation to turn every incident into a demonstration of their sophistication and control. Sometimes the most honest response to a security probe is simply: "We detected it, we contained it, and here's what we learned."
The Real Stakes
The cybersecurity industry's increasing comfort with deception and theater isn't just an abstract ethical concern. It has real consequences for security outcomes and public trust.
When cybersecurity becomes primarily about outperforming adversaries in elaborate games rather than protecting systems and data, the industry loses sight of its core mission. The result is spectacular demonstrations of threat hunting capabilities alongside persistent vulnerabilities to basic attacks.
More troubling, the emphasis on deception and narrative control erodes the credibility cybersecurity professionals need to advocate for necessary but unglamorous security investments. When every incident becomes an opportunity for marketing theater, stakeholders become skeptical of genuine security recommendations.
The cybersecurity industry stands at a crossroads. It can continue down the path of increasing deception and adversarial engagement, optimizing for dramatic stories and reputation management. Or it can refocus on its core mission: building systems and organizations that are genuinely more secure.
The Resecurity incident isn't really about one company's response to threat actors. It's a mirror reflecting an industry that has lost sight of what actually matters. The question is whether we're willing to look honestly at what we see.
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